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Informal social norms with sanctions can be explained, in principle, by a rational choice 
approach. Coleman (1990) and others (Ellickson 1991; see also Hechter & Opp 2001) have 
argued that norms serve to improve the efficiency or the aggregate welfare of the norm 
beneficiaries. For example, the farmers studied in Ellickson’s seminal work (1991) have 
privately (i.e. without the support of third parties besides the community of farmers) enforced 
norms that foster cooperation among neighbors. Such norms govern the solution of conflicts 
in cases of cattle trespassing or provide rules on how to share costs of constructing boundary 
fences in a large agricultural area. It is commonly argued that a demand for norms arises in 
situations of a social dilemma, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., Ellickson 1991: Chapter 
9). Norms are, however, effectively realized only if there are sanctions that punish non-
cooperative behavior.  Where do these sanctions come from?  An obvious answer is that 
repeated interactions among norm beneficiaries help to enforce norms of cooperation. Given 
repeated interactions, strategies of conditional cooperation will be possible. These strategies 
contain a sanctioning mechanism that triggers defection if a partner defects. The logic of 
repeated games is the rationale of Ellickson’s hypothesis on the effects of a “close-knit 
community” on the enforcement of norms. In a similar vein, Coleman (1990: Chapter 11) has 
argued that the existence of a closed network of social relations is important for the 
realization of norms. This paper does not deny the importance of repeated interactions in the 
context of norms. However, two points that are neglected in the traditional approach of the 
Coleman-Ellickson type, will be addressed: First, it is somewhat misleading to study norms 
only by means of using stage games of the prisoner’s dilemma kind. This is so because 
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repetitions of the prisoner’s dilemma give rise to indirect sanctions of using the Nash threat to 
defect. Ethnographic evidences abound that in real life many other, more active, types of 
sanctions are used: ostracism, physical retaliation, refusal of social approval, gossip etc. It is 
therefore important to study games that represent situations where the actors have an 
opportunity to apply direct sanctions. A very simple case of such a game is the norm game 
(Voss 2001). This is a modified prisoner’s dilemma with an additional punishment phase. 
Secondly, given a norm game with a punishment option, the question of the possibility of 
cooperation in the one-shot game seems appropriate because the norm game is strategically 
different from the prisoner’s dilemma. In a norm game, under certain conditions, there exist 
Nash equilibria of mutual cooperation. Experimental work (Fehr & Gächter 2000b) 
demonstrates that even in one-shot situations the level and proportion of cooperative behavior 
increases if an punishment option is available to the players of a public goods game. It is 
therefore important to analyze conditions such that this is consistent with a rational choice 
approach. The paper is meant as a first step toward this task. The main result will be that non-
standard assumptions about human motivations or preferences can explain norms with 
sanctions even in one-shot situations. This is shown by an analysis of the norm game with two 
well-known recent models of fairness (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Fehr & Schmidt 1999) from 
behavioral game theory. 
 
 
2. Cooperation in a norm game 
 
The norm game is a two-person non-cooperative game with the following properties (Voss 
2001): There are two phases of the game. The first comprises an ordinary prisoner’s dilemma 
with two options, namely cooperation and defection. In the second phase, both players can 
react on the decisions of the first stage by punishing their partner. The payoffs are simply 
assumed to be sums of the payoffs that are collected in both phases. With respect to the 
prisoner’s dilemma it is, for convenience, assumed that for both players T>R >P>S.  In the 
punishment phase, a player is able to sanction her partner. The target’s cost or fine of being 
(passively) punished is denoted by  p. The cost of (actively) punishing is k. Is it possible, 
under assumptions of individual rationality, that both actors comply with the norm? 
Rationality in this context means that compliance with the norm (cooperation) is (i) a Nash 
equilibrium strategy and (ii) the equilibrium is subgame perfect (spe). Subgame perfection is 
an important rationality criterion because the norm game is sequential, that is, the players are 




game theoretical rationality are used. In other words, in sequences of the game which are “out 
of equilibrium” there should be incentives to apply those punishments.  
 
It is easily seen (Voss 2001) that there exists a Nash equilibrium that yields mutual 
cooperation if p ≥ T-R. In other words, cooperation is possible if the fine from the partner’s 
punishment is at least as large as the costs of cooperation (T-R). Intuitively, this means that 
the prisoner’s dilemma is transformed into a different game, namely a kind of assurance 
game, if sanctions are possible. Another obvious result, however, is that this equilibrium is 
subgame perfect under the condition that k ≤ 0. In other words, mutual cooperation which is 
based on reciprocal threats to punish defections in the second phase is possible only under the 
condition of costless sanctioning. If punishment is costly to the agent who actively sanctions 
his partner, that is, if k>0, the threat to use it will not be credible in the one-shot case. (N.B.: 
This is different in the repeated game, but we will not dwell on that point here.) The game 
theoretic analysis of the norm game therefore leads to the following conclusion with respect 
to the so-called second order dilemma (sanctions yield norm conformity, but there is free 
riding with regard to the costs of using sanctions): In a one-shot norm game no subgame 
perfect equilibrium of mutual cooperation exists if sanctions are costly (k>0). 
 
 
3. Non-standard preferences in the one-shot norm game 
 
Besides anecdotal evidence there is experimental work that is relevant to actual behavior in 
the one-shot norm game. Fehr and Gächter (2000b, 2002) run public goods experiments with 
an additional option of punishing. Surprisingly, there were substantial effects of the 
punishment option even in a one-shot case: If punishment is possible, the level of cooperation 
with regard to the public good is higher. Furthermore, costly punishment was in fact applied 
to sanction free riders. These results are important to our discussion of norms because the 
public goods game of Fehr and Gächter is structurally similar to the norm game. We expect 
that analogous experimental results would be obtained with regard to the simpler, two person 
norm game. 
 
Section 2 has reported the analytical result that no subgame perfect equilibria of norm 
conformity are possible in the one-shot case. We now ask whether a game theoretic approach 
that uses assumptions on non-standard motivations (preferences) can explain cooperation and 




The assumption that individuals’ preferences are more than functions of the material payoffs 
is of course quite common in the tradition of individualist social theory. Alluding to Adam 
Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, Frank (1988) argued that human actors are disposed to 
show certain emotional reactions if their partners cheat them or deviate from moral norms. 
Reasoning along these lines one is tempted to conclude that the function of certain emotional 
dispositions is to make threats or promises credible. For example, an emotional disposition 
that may be called “negative reciprocity” (Fehr and Gächter 2000a) yields costly punishments 
as a reaction toward a partner who defected in some sense even in one-shot situations. Given 
this, under the assumption of complete information about these preferences or dispositions, 
the partner who anticipates this reaction rationally cooperates in a one-shot situation, provided 
the reciprocity motive is strong enough. 
 
Behavioral and evolutionary game theory recently started to develop models of rational (or 
boundedly rational or at least adaptive) behavior such that the standard assumptions of a 
homo economicus are dispensed with. Whereas homo economicus is self-regarding and 
outcome-regarding, it seems more realistic to assume a model of man such that preferences 
are also other-regarding and process-regarding (Gintis 2000: 251; cf. Gintis 2000: Chapter 11 
for an excellent survey on these new models).  
 
Two models from behavioral game theory seem particularly suitable to analyze other-
regarding behavior. The ERC (Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition) model (Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000) and the Fehr and Schmidt (FS) model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) represent 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions with non-standard preferences that include a 
“social component”. The arguments of the utility function are material outcomes. We assume 
T>R>P>S>0. In both models, utility functions are depending on two kinds of arguments. 
There is first a component f that depends on an individual i’s material payoffs yi. A second 
term g reflects the deviation of the material payoff from a reference payoff. In both models, 
individuals experience disutilities if there inequalities between material outcomes: 
 
(Inequality Aversion) u(yi) = f (yi) – g (deviation of yi from reference payoff). 
 
The social component of ERC preferences is defined such that actors compare their own 
material payoff with the average outcome in the reference group. There is a behavioral 
tendency to be inequality aversive: Absolute utility decreases if an actor receives less (or 




can deal with a large set of games. It is given in an axiomatic form. Depending on 
specifications of the parameters of the utility functions, it reflects different degrees of egoism 
or fairness (or a population with heterogeneity). Completely selfish behavior is a limiting case 
of the model. We use a special simplified version of ERC for 2 person games (i=1,2): 
 
(ERC) ui= aiyi – bi (0.5 – σi)2 
 
In (ERC) i’s utility is depending on i’s material outcomes yi and on a reference standard σi 
that reflects the share of  i’s payoffs relative to the sum of the payoffs of the group members. 
In this specification, it is assumed that n = 2. Hence, the fair share is 0.5. If σi= 0.5, the actor’s 
behavior will correspond to usual positively linearly increasing utility in money (or in other 
cardinal material payoffs). The parameters ai and bi (with ai > 0; bi > 0) represent the amounts 
of selfish or other-regarding orientations, respectively. If bi→0, the actor’s preferences are, in 
the limiting case, completely self-regarding. The exponent of the second term represents the 
idea that larger differences from the fair allocation nonlinearly affect (dis)utility. Notice that 
in the specification of ERC that is used here it is assumed that one feels equally 
uncomfortable if one receives too much or too little compared with the standard. This is, 
however, not a necessary assumption, but is employed merely for convenience and can in 
principle be dispensed with. 
 
In contrast to ERC, the Fehr and Schmidt (FS) model does not compare an individual’s share 
with the (average) group outcome, but the differences of an actor i’s outcome and each other 
actor’s outcomes are summed over all persons who are “richer” or “poorer” than i, 
respectively. For the special case of a two-person game the utility function is: 
 
(FS)  ui = yi - ai max{yj – yi, 0} - bi max{yi - yj, 0} 
 
The parameters ai and bi are individual-specific. It is assumed that 0 ≤ bi < 1; bi ≤ ai.  
 
In the following, we present results of an analysis of the one-shot norm game that is based on 
these assumptions: 
 
(A1) The players who are involved in a norm game are completely rational but are endowed 





(A2) The players are acting under complete information with regard to each other’s 
preferences. 
 
Proposition 1 (ERC): Given ERC preferences, under certain conditions there exists a pair of 
cooperative strategies in the one-shot norm game which are subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategies. 
 
Proposition 2 (ERC): Given ERC preferences, a necessary although not sufficient condition 
for a pair of strategies in the one-shot norm game to yield cooperation as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium is, for k>0, that p/k ≥ T/S. 
 
The proof of propositions 1 and 2 follows from the fact that subgame perfection requires that 
in the second phase of the norm game u(s*) ≤ u(s). Here u(s*) denotes the utility without 
sanctioning and u(s) is the utility of an actor sanctioning the defective co-player. In other 
words, after the partner’s defection (which is albeit “out of equilibrium”) there must be no 
positive incentive to deviate from the application of a punishment (s).  
 
Proposition 3 (FS): Given FS preferences, a necessary and sufficient condition for a pair of 
strategies in the one-shot norm game to yield cooperation as a subgame equilibrium is, for 
k>0, that ap ≥ k(1 + a). 
 
Notice that in the case of T-p > S-k, such that the defector gains more than the cooperator, 
subgame perfection requires u(s*) ≤ u(s) with 
 
u(s*) = S – ai(T-S),     
u(s)   = S – k – ai((T –p)-(S-k)). 
 





The paper has shown that rational actors are able to enforce social norms with sanctions even 
in one-shot situations and for costly punishments (k>0). The result can be obtained by using 




cases, there are conditions such that a behavioral tendency to avoid inequalities enables actors 
to make threats to punish defections credible. Notice that this is not an ad hoc explanation for 
cooperation in a norm game. ERC- and FS-models are relatively general theoretical 
instruments to model non-standard motivation functions in a variety of circumstances. They 
were not designed to analyze norm games. Therefore, our results, in principle, contribute to an 
enlargement of the empirical content of these models. 
 
With regard to the substantive problem of explaining norms, it is important to note that our 
paper does argue that the second order problem can be resolved in the one-shot case if certain 
non-standard motivations are assumed. We do not argue against individual rationality and 
rational choice. In our interpretation, other-regarding preferences are commitment devices 
that transform negative reciprocity (and possibly also positive reciprocity) into a rational 
strategy that is consistent with basic rationality criteria of standard game theory.  
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